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INTRODUCTION
As globalization has fostered increasing cross-border crime, so too has it
triggered increasing international law enforcement cooperation. Government
leaders like former FBI Director James Comey,1 former SEC Chair Mary Jo
White,2 former Attorney General Loretta Lynch,3 and Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch4 have all emphasized the urgency of such expansion in numerous
1 See, e.g., James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Confronting the Cyber Threat (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/confronting-the-cyber-threat [http://perma.cc/X59Y-4UPU] (“[W]e’re
going to deploy more of our people around the world. We’re going to push our analysts, and our cyber agents,
our experts, to more and more places around the world—because even though this is an infrastructure-, a
fiber-optic-based threat, those physical relationships, especially with our foreign partners where the keyboards
may sit in their jurisdictions, matter tremendously.”); James B. Comey, Director, FBI, The FBI’s Approach to
the Cyber Threat (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbis-approach-to-the-cyber-threat
[https://perma.cc/294C-NQK2] (“[W]e’re trying to forward deploy far more cyber agents and cyber analysts
and have them sit with our foreign partners.”); James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Fighting Terrorism in the
Digital Age (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fighting-terrorism-in-the-digital-age
[http://perma.cc/U9B4-6FPU] (“[W]e have to work together with our federal, state, local, and international
partners to identify and stop those who are coming after us.”).
2 See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Securities Regulation in the Interconnected, Global
Marketplace (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/securities-regulation-in-theinterconnected-global-marketplace.html [http://perma.cc/G6JZ-RD2F] (“While international
cooperation and coordination have increased significantly in recent years, we still face significant
challenges from laws and practices that can impede strong regulation, supervision, and enforcement.
And it is incumbent upon the SEC and our international counterparts to work through these issues
in a way that provides maximum cooperation and coordination and avoids regulatory arbitrage.”).
3 See, e.g., Loretta Lynch, U.S. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Addresses the
20th Annual International Association of Prosecutors Conference (Sept. 14, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-addresses-20th-annualinternational-association [http://perma.cc/K6GW-LFHS] (“As we have seen time and again that
collaboration is crucial, and it’s why we have worked hard to strengthen the bonds we share with our
partners, and to enhance cooperation in all law enforcement matters—from corruption to white
collar crime and money laundering; from terrorism to cyberattacks. To achieve this end, it is essential
that we have strong mechanisms for providing mutual legal assistance to each other . . . .”).
4 Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Release: Lynch Agrees to Work with Hatch on
Republican High-Tech Task Force Priorities (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/releases?ID=71B6D550-494A-4127-84E4-BB251339FB04 [http://perma.cc/4FKNHZ5M] (highlighting the importance of the LEADS Act, sponsored by the Senator, which seeks to
“promote international comity and law enforcement cooperation”).
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speeches and in their allocation of resources. Cases of terrorism, cybercrime,
financial fraud, and corruption are forcing the U.S. government to rely
increasingly on foreign partners for extraditions, evidence gathering for use
at U.S. trials, parallel investigations, and informal investigative support.
However, U.S. jurisprudence has not kept pace with these developments. An
emerging struggle for U.S. prosecutors comes when our laws, and in
particular our Constitution, clash with those of a partner country. This
Comment will outline one such predicament found in United States v. Allen:
whether the Fifth Amendment bars the admission of testimony compelled by
a foreign sovereign.5 Because there are no other cases that have addressed this
specific issue,6 this Comment will analogize to related Supreme Court
precedent and other situations to theorize how other courts will and should
treat foreign government–compelled testimony. Part I of this Comment will
first analyze the full Allen hypothetical and the Second Circuit’s ruling. Part
II of the Comment will consider the Department of Justice’s analogizing of
the Allen situation to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Balsys7
regarding the applicability of the Fifth Amendment in a U.S. deposition
where the defendant fears criminal prosecution by a foreign government. It
will address three arguments raised by the Balsys Court in arriving at its
decision, namely 1) the textual context of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2) the
Same-Sovereign Rule, and 3) relevant policy considerations, and apply them
to the Allen situation. Part II will then apply the Balsys Court’s suggestion of
a standard based on “cooperative internationalism,” or closeness of law
5 Note that Judge Jed Rakoff of the District Court intentionally sidestepped the self-incrimination
issue in the initial opinion on this case, though the Second Circuit overturned him on that basis and
denied the government’s request for a rehearing en banc. 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
rev’d, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging and then declining to address the issue, deciding the
case on alternate grounds); reh’g en banc denied No. 16-898 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2017).
6 The Second Circuit cited to numerous ostensibly parallel cases in footnotes 67 and 68 of its
decision as “sufficient to resolve the present dispute regarding whether compulsion by a foreign
power implicates the Fifth Amendment” in favor of full Fifth Amendment protections. United
States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 80 nn.67–68 (2d Cir. 2017). However, those cases are all quite factually
distinct from the Allen situation, as they focus on coercive acts by foreign governments, rather than
those that might simply be considered compelled. For a full discussion on this distinction see infra
subsection III.B.2.
Ironically, some of the same cases cited by the Second Circuit are also cited in a 2016
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report as evidence of the opposite proposition that “the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and its attendant Miranda warning requirements do not
apply to statements made abroad to foreign officials.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2016). The
CRS report goes on to discuss voluntariness as a general prerequisite for admissibility, but cites to
only domestic cases and those where voluntariness is in question due to torture or other acts that
“shock the conscience,” a materially different issue and one that does not address the
involuntariness/compulsion distinction previously mentioned. Id. at 28-29.
7 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
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enforcement cooperation, to trigger Fifth Amendment applicability. Part III of
the Comment will assess 1) courts’ occasional practice of assuming applicability
without any discussion, 2) parallels to the case law on Miranda warnings and
broader due process arguments, and 3) testimony compelled by Congress. Part
IV will analyze the spectrum of potential standards courts could apply to the
admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony. In addition to
considering six different options, from barring any self-incriminatory
compelled testimony to allowing all of it, the Comment will recommend a
middle path forward based on differing levels of cooperation and good faith
efforts by prosecutors. Although foreign-compelled testimony enters complex
legal territory, it should be allowed into evidence where the U.S. government
is not acting entirely in concert with foreign officials and where U.S. officials
have taken reasonable steps to avoid Fifth Amendment concerns.
I. THE PROBLEM POSED BY UNITED STATES V. ALLEN
In United States v. Allen, the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit diverged on a highly salient issue of first impression. Anthony
Allen and Anthony Conti, among others, were charged in federal court with
wire fraud after they were suspected of manipulating U.S. dollar and Japanese
Yen London Interbank Offered Rates8 (LIBOR).9 As part of an independent
United Kingdom investigation into the same conduct, Allen and Conti were
compelled to testify by the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA),10
potentially under penalty of imprisonment.11 U.K. regulators granted the
men direct use immunity, but not derivative use immunity, a distinction
disallowed under U.S. law.12 Paul Robson, who ultimately became an
8 LIBOR is a metric to gauge interest rates for bank borrowing across different currencies and
can be described as “one of the best known and most important interest rates in the world . . . . [due
to] its widespread use as a benchmark for many other interest rates at which business is actually carried
out.” John Kiff, What is LIBOR?, INT’L MONETARY FUND: FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2012, at 32, 32,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/pdf/basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSG5-3NY8].
9 Superseding Indictment at 33-34, Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
10 The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority has criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement
powers. See Enforcement, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement
[http://perma.cc/H87V-HF8V]. The entity is essentially a counterpart to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, but with enforcement powers that include imprisonment. See, e.g., Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000, ch. 8, §§ 397(1), (8)(b), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2000/8/pdfs/ukpga_20000008_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/GPA8-EX57] (ascribing a sentence of up to
seven years imprisonment for the provision of a false or misleading statement on investments under
certain circumstances, enforced by the Financial Conduct Authority).
11 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 688.
12 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL
§ 718 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-718-derivative-use-immunity
[https://perma.cc/L58P-EV22] (discussing the Supreme Court’s upholding of the federal immunity
statute mandating both direct and derivative use immunity). For the purposes of this Comment, the
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immunized witness in the United States, was interviewed by the FCA and,
pursuant to U.K. law, provided with transcripts from Allen’s and Conti’s
compelled interviews.13 In response, attorneys for Allen and Conti both
submitted motions asking the U.S. court to compel immunity for their
clients, but they were rejected.14 After Robson’s testimony in the U.S.
contributed to a successful conviction of Allen and Conti, their lawyers
submitted a motion for a post-trial Kastigar hearing.15 They argued that,
because Robson’s review of their FCA transcripts violated their Fifth
Amendment rights and therefore tainted Robson’s testimony in the U.S.
proceedings, the charges against Allen and Conti should be dismissed.16
Cognizant of the potential problem, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) had made clear to Robson before he testified in U.S. court that he was
not to share any of the information he gleaned from Allen’s and Conti’s
transcripts with U.S. prosecutors, and the DOJ held extensive meetings with
the FCA about the need to establish a wall between the two agencies to
prevent any taint of the DOJ’s case.17 In fact, the DOJ went as far as to use a
separate filter team of attorneys from a different section of the Department
to address issues related to the FCA depositions.18 Of note, the potential U.S.
constitutional concerns of compelled testimony had apparently been raised
by defense counsel to U.K. authorities during a U.K. hearing.19
distinction between direct use and derivative use immunity presents a wrinkle in analyzing the
appropriateness of using compelled testimony in U.S. courts, and highlights the reality that U.S. and
foreign protections against self-incrimination do not perfectly overlap. But, this is not a primary
concern of this Comment. For a fuller treatment of this issue, see generally Neal Modi, Note, Toward
an International Right Against Self-Incrimination: Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s “Compelled” to Foreign
Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961 (2017).
13 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 689.
14 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Government to
Immunize Submitter-R1 and for a Rule 15 Deposition of Submitter-R1, or, in the Alternative, to Exclude
Testimony from Government Witnesses at 18-19, Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR); see
also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Government to Immunize
Submitter-R3, or, in the Alternative, for a Jury Instruction Regarding Submitter-R3’s Testimony at 1, 13,
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
15 “When a witness/defendant establishes [that the government used or intends to use
immunized testimony to indict him or prove his guilt], a proceeding known as a Kastigar hearing
is used to determine if the government improperly used his immunized testimony . . . . The timing
of the hearing varies; many courts hold it before trial, but others defer it until during or after trial.”
1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE § 12.15 (2d ed. 2006).
16 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 690.
17 Id. at 694-95.
18 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 2 n.1,
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
19 Oral Argument at 31:20-32:30, United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898-cr),
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/oral_arguments.html (click on “2017” and scroll to Jan. 26, 2017 arguments)
[https://perma.cc/QQ6A-KQYH].
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Intentionally avoiding the question of the Fifth Amendment’s applicability,20
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York settled the hearing on a
separate issue. Judge Rakoff held that the DOJ established a “strict and effective
wall of separation”21 that insulated the government’s case from any potentially
tainted evidence and met whatever Kastigar burden might exist on the facts
presented. But on appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed, finding a blanket ban
“on the use of compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings . . . even
when a foreign sovereign has compelled the testimony.”22 Moreover, the Second
Circuit found that the witnesses were substantially exposed to compelled
testimony, reversing the convictions and dismissing the indictment.23
The Second Circuit’s ruling raises two issues: 1) whether resource-intensive,
complex, and potentially risky machinations by the DOJ should be necessary,
and 2) in the face of such strict judicial scrutiny, whether close international law
enforcement cooperation is advisable under the Second Circuit’s new
precedent. Fundamentally, the question that needs to be answered is this: In a
case where otherwise inadmissible evidence from a foreign government’s legal
proceedings leaks into a U.S. prosecution through no direct action by U.S.
authorities, can that evidence taint the entire case, requiring dismissal? As Allen
demonstrates, this question is no longer a mere hypothetical.24
II. ANALYZING THE BALSYS SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The closest analogous Supreme Court precedent to the Allen situation,
and the primary precedent cited in the Government’s brief opposing the

20 See Allen, 160 F. Supp 3d at 690 n.8 (ruling that there was no need to determine if Kastigar
applied, because even if it did apply to foreign government–compelled testimony, the government
had already met its Kastigar burden).
21 Id. at 695.
22 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68.
23 Id. at 69.
24 Indeed, at a 2016 conference sponsored by the American Society of International Law and attended
by the author, a panel discussion between Judge Jed Rakoff and Carol Sipperly (an Allen prosecuting
attorney) highlighted the issue of foreign-compelled testimony as one likely to arise with increasing
frequency in federal court. In a recent article for Law360, David Rundle of the law firm
WilmerHale raised a similar sentiment. See David Rundle, Testing the 5th: Compelled Testimony From
Foreign Gov’ts, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2016, 10:36 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/782250/testing-the5th-compelled-testimony-from-foreign-gov-ts [https://perma.cc/4NKC-5XJN] (noting the combination of
international investigations into financial institutions and the wide jurisdictional reach of federal courts is
likely to lead to further cases like Allen). The issue has been raised hypothetically at least as far back as 2014.
See John Vukelj & Megan K. Vesely, How the SEC May Receive Testimony Compelled in U.K., Canada,
N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202649563089/How-the-SEC-MayReceive-Testimony-Compelled-in-UK-Canada?slreturn=20170817223350 [http://perma.cc/44ER-3NNF]
(“[T]he exchange of [foreign government–compelled] testimony raises concerns about how the
privilege against self-incrimination operates in cross-border investigations.”).
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Kastigar motion to dismiss in Allen, is United States v. Balsys.25 There, Justice
Souter’s 7–2 majority opinion limited Fifth Amendment protections for
individuals facing foreign prosecution.26 The Balsys plaintiff was a suspected
Nazi war criminal subpoenaed by the Department of Justice’s Office of
Special Investigations (OSI), an office formed specifically to denaturalize and
deport Nazis.27 He invoked the Fifth Amendment at a DOJ deposition,
claiming that his responses to OSI’s questions “could subject him to criminal
prosecution by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.”28 The Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiff ’s refusal to testify, basing its opinion on the textual
context of the Fifth Amendment in the Constitution, the same-sovereign rule
originally gleaned from United States v. Murdock,29 and policy considerations
that weighed heavily towards executive branch deference.30 Ultimately, the
Balsys Court found that sufficiently close cooperation between U.S.
prosecutors and their foreign counterparts could be grounds for exclusion,
but that the facts at issue in Balsys did not merit such a finding.31
These elements offer unique insight into the problem of foreign-compelled
testimony, because Balsys is Allen’s mirror image. In Balsys, U.S. prosecutors
compelled statements that could be used in possible overseas prosecutions, while in
Allen overseas prosecutors compelled statements that were used in a U.S.
prosecution. Balsys also introduces the salient concept of a threshold point for
“cooperative internationalism,” or a point at which U.S. and foreign prosecutors
collaborate so closely that they should be considered the same for Fifth Amendment
purposes.32 As such, although key distinctions exist between the two cases, the Balsys
decision provides a foundation for analyzing an Allen-type situation.
A. Applying Three Core Balsys Arguments
Though Balsys is not binding precedent, three of the core arguments made
by the Supreme Court in that case are instructive here: the linguistic context
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the same-sovereign rule, and the several
policy considerations raised. Interestingly, however, the Second Circuit panel
in Allen, both in the opinion and during oral arguments, refrained from serious
analysis of Balsys outside of rejecting the relevancy of the same-sovereign
25
26
27
28
29

524 U.S. 666 (1998).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 670.
Id.
290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (“[O]ne under examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse
to answer on account of probable incrimination under state law.”).
30 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 691-698.
31 Id. at 693-96 (identifying the concept of cooperative internationalism and rejecting it as a
sufficient issue in the case).
32 Id. at 698-699.
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rule.33 The Department of Justice devoted some analysis to Balsys in its original
district court brief,34 but the Government’s arguments on appeal focused on a
wider interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that drew parallels between the
positioning of a private enterprise and foreign government.35 This strategy
was handily rejected by the Second Circuit.36 Ultimately, then, the three core
Balsys arguments are most instructive as an analytical framework largely
neglected at the Second Circuit.
1. Linguistic Context of the Self-Incrimination Clause37
The Fifth Amendment’s meaning is comparatively less clear in the Allen
context than the Court purports it to be in Balsys. The Balsys Court applies the
noscitur a sociis38 canon of interpretation to assert that the Self-Incrimination
Clause should be read in the context of the other clauses of the Fifth
Amendment, rather than as drawing a contrast to the further-removed Sixth
Amendment, which clearly only applies in a domestic context.39 Specifically,
the Court asserts that the Self-Incrimination Clause’s reference to “any
criminal case” was meant to distinguish the Clause from an earlier portion of
the Amendment referencing “capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s]” rather
than to broaden the Clause to cover international jurisdictions.40 No historical
records or legislative history from the enactment of the Constitution speak to

33 See Oral Argument at 1:18:30-1:25:15, United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No.
16-898-cr), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/oral_arguments.html (click on “2017” and scroll to Jan. 26,
2017 arguments) [https://perma.cc/QQ6A-KQYH] (discussing the compelled testimony issue with
no references to the “same-sovereign” issue or to Balsys); see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 85-86 (refuting
the Government’s “same-sovereign” argument by distinguishing the Fifth Amendment as a personal
trial right without engaging any of the substantive arguments in Balsys).
34 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 7-11,
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (arguing that
following Balsys, the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated when a foreign sovereign compels
testimony under the same-sovereign rule).
35 Allen, 864 F.3d at 84.
36 See id. at 84-85 (rejecting the Government’s private employer argument).
37 The full text of the Fifth Amendment is as follows: “No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
38 “It is known from its associates.”
39 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998).
40 Id.
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the linguistic issue.41 Such a finding raises the question as to which aspects of
“any criminal case” are limited to domestic applicability.
In an Allen-type situation, the issue is whether a “criminal case” as defined
under the Fifth Amendment includes an intentional investigative portion by
another foreign body. As highlighted by the Second Circuit, the prosecution
is undoubtedly domestic,42 but the gathering of evidence in preparation for
that prosecution occurs internationally, informed at least somewhat by
independent foreign government actors who are not obligated to comply with
the Fifth Amendment. The Court held in Kastigar v. United States that the
Fifth Amendment privilege “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it
protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution . . . .”43 As with the Fifth Amendment text, the
Kastigar Court did not distinguish whether “any disclosures” referred only to
disclosures to domestic authorities and in domestic proceedings or to
international ones as well, but the Balsys Court’s domestic-only interpretation
could arguably suggest the former.44 Where foreign governments do the
compelling, it is unclear whether that foreign government investigation is
intended to be treated as part of “any criminal case” under the Fifth
Amendment when the resulting evidence enters a U.S. trial.
Per Supreme Court precedent in Chavez v. Martinez, a violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause occurs when such evidence is used at trial, not
during the act of coercive questioning.45 In Chavez, the Court distinguished
between claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, stating,

41 Id. at 673 n.5 (citing to sources asserting the Self-Incrimination Clause has almost no
legislative grounding and that the “any criminal case” language was added for purposes irrelevant
here). The dissent concedes the lack of history undergirding the Self-Incrimination Clause and its
extraterritorial applicability. Id. at 711-12 (citing the analysis of United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419,
1435 (11th Cir. 1997) among other sources, to establish an absence of legislative history on Fifth
Amendment privilege).
42 See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Whatever may occur prior to
trial, the right not to testify against oneself at trial is ‘absolute.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013))).
43 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
44 Supra note 41. However, note that the Second Circuit in Allen interpreted this same issue
differently. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 86 n.99 (citing to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor that the use of compelled testimony at trial is part of the courts’
“‘supervisory power’ over the administration of justice in federal courts,” and characterizing it as
consistent with Balsys (quoting 378 U.S. 52, 81 (1964)) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
45 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (“[I]t is not until [an unconstitutionally compelled statement’s] use
in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.”). Note that this precedent
is relied on by the Allen defendant. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment on Kastigar Grounds at 3, United States
v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (citing to Chavez in its
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Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause do not mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession
is constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial; it
simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather
than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, would govern the
inquiry in those cases and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.46

Coercive questions then can violate different rights at different
times—Fourteenth Amendment due process rights at the time of
questioning and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination upon
their admission at trial.47 Still, although self-incrimination may occur when the
evidence is used at trial, it must be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment
in the first place to constitute a violation.48 At issue, then, is whether foreign
government–compelled testimony should be carved out as “extra-Constitutional”
testimony in a U.S. trial, which Chavez does not address.
2. Limitations Imposed by the Same-Sovereign Rule
As argued by the Department of Justice, the same-sovereign rule originally
espoused in United States v. Murdock49 points in the direction of limiting the
applicability of the Self-Incrimination Clause in such cases.50 The Balsys Court
explains the same-sovereign rule as “limiting [the Self-Incrimination Clause’s]
principle to concern with prosecution by a sovereign that is itself bound by the
argument that “a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs not when the involuntary statements are
elicited, but when they are used in a U.S. prosecution” (emphasis in original)).
46 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773.
47 Note that this issue was raised at oral arguments, in briefs, and in the final opinion. See, e.g.,
Oral Argument at 1:18:30-1:25:15, Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (No. 16-898-cr), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/
oral_arguments.html (click on “2017” and scroll to Jan. 26, 2017 arguments)
[https://perma.cc/QQ6A-KQYH]. (raising the idea that constitutional concerns outside of the Fifth
Amendment could arise from foreign government–compelled testimony); see also Allen, 864 F.3d at
83 (rejecting the Government’s citation to Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), on the basis that
it was a Fourteenth Amendment case). This question raises two subsidiary issues: 1) whether
testimony collected abroad, that would arguably violate a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights if collected in the United States, is in fact a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and if so 2) whether a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment related to self-incrimination
necessarily implicates the Fifth Amendment and would lead to tainted evidence at trial. Perhaps a
defense attorney could argue to exclude evidence at trial on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, or on
Fifth Amendment grounds based on the Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, but such
arguments are beyond the scope of this Comment.
48 See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) (asserting that individuals can waive
constitutional concerns about privilege in appropriate circumstances).
49 290 U.S. 389, 391 (1933), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor,
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
50 See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 7-11,
Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (explaining that the Self-Incrimination Clause
should not apply to all cases of this type).
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Clause.”51 Parallel to Balsys, Murdock involved a federal defendant hesitant to
testify for fear of self-incrimination in state court, a concern about which the
Court was unmoved.52 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
overturned Murdock,53 a move the Balsys majority explained was necessary after
Malloy v. Hogan54 “applied the doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment due process
incorporation to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to bind the States as well
as the National Government to recognize the privilege.”55 Interestingly,
Murphy dealt with a situation parallel to Allen rather than Murdock or Balsys,
as the concern in Murphy was that compelled state testimony might be
admitted into evidence at a federal trial.56 The Murphy Court resolved this
incongruence by saying that since the privilege was fully applicable to both
sovereigns, the question was the same.57 This meant that post-Malloy, the
federal and state governments were seen as the same-sovereign, maintaining
Murdock’s logic but undercutting its presumption that state and federal
governments represented fundamentally different sovereigns.58
If read broadly, Balsys suggests that the primary concern of the case law is
matching the source of compulsion and the source of prosecution, rather than
simply determining whether there was unconstitutional compulsion to elicit
evidence which was then used in a U.S. trial. In reconciling Murdock with
Murphy, the Court emphasized that “the courts of a government from which
a witness may reasonably fear prosecution may not in fairness compel the
witness to furnish testimonial evidence that may be used to prove his guilt.”59
Where foreign governments are concerned, U.S. prosecutors generally have
no hand in compelling testimony. Justice Breyer’s dissent decried the
underlying proposition here that “prosecution by a different sovereign seems
not quite as unfair as prosecution by the same-sovereign,”60 but the Court’s
majority accepted this reasoning because of the marked differences between
51
52

United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 689 (1998).
Murdock, 290 U.S. at 391, 397 (affirming the lower court’s conviction of the defendant for
refusing to give testimony).
53 378 U.S. 52, 73 (1964), abrogated by Balsys, 524 U.S. 666.
54 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the petitioner
the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination”).
55 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 680-81.
56 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 53-54.
57 Id. at 53 n.1.
58 Using this logic, the Balsys Court rejected the Murphy Court’s claim to overturn Murdock.
See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 689. The Balsys majority explicitly rejected the Murphy majority’s policy
arguments as well as its historical arguments unrelated to Malloy and the Fourteenth Amendment
for overturning Murdock. Id. at 686-91.
59 Id. at 683. Note that, in Allen, the government advanced the same argument using this quote.
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 9, United
States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
60 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 717-18.
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the federal–state and U.S.–foreign power relationships.61 The majority saw
the fairness issue as helping a defendant avoid being “‘whipsawed’ into
incriminating himself under both state and federal law, even though the
privilege [against self-incrimination] was applicable to each,”62 and avoiding
historical practices of an overreaching government coercing confessions.63
But, these are not of grave concern where the compelling and prosecuting
authorities diverge in their legal obligations.64 In the Balsys and Allen
contexts, deterrence only extends so far as U.S. authorities can persuade their
foreign counterparts to follow U.S. law to which they are not subject, unlike
the States which are directly subject to the Fifth Amendment under
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation.65 Without such a connection, the
rationale of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not met and the Murphy
arguments for applicability are undermined.
Herein potentially lies a divergence between an Allen analysis and a Balsys
analysis. Allen presents a scenario where U.S. authorities have significantly
more control over the resulting prosecution than in Balsys, where foreign
governments can use the defendant’s American-compelled testimony as they
wish. U.S. prosecutors could share evidence with foreign counterparts only
when they are convinced it will not be used in contravention of the Eighth
Amendment or move for judges to seal proceedings where evidence exposing
defendants to self-incrimination in a foreign jurisdiction could come into
play, but such actions are within the discretion of prosecutors and are not
required,66 and judges are particularly hesitant to infringe on the executive
branch’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.67
In line with the Second Circuit’s general reasoning, the increased
American control over fairness of prosecution in Allen-type scenarios places
a heavier burden on U.S. prosecutors to ensure that fairness is achieved
because courts would be addressing the conduct of U.S. prosecutors without
the Balsys-type direct implications for American foreign policy. Prosecutor

61 In fact, the Balsys majority acknowledged that “[p]rior to Murphy, such ‘whipsawing’ efforts
had been permissible, but arguably less outrageous since, as the opinion notes, ‘either the
“compelling” government or the “using” government [was] a State, and, until today, the States were
not deemed fully bound by the privilege against self-incrimination.’” Id. at 681-82 n.7 (quoting
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57 n.6).
62 Id. at 667.
63 Id. at 693 (noting that preventing government overreach “lies at the core of the [Self-Incrimination]
Clause’s purposes”).
64 See supra notes 52, 57–58.
65 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
66 Note that judges could take similar actions unilaterally as well.
67 Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) (“Historically, most scholars have accepted with little question the
notion that the Court will defer to executive views in core matters of foreign relations.”).
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misconduct with regard to compelled testimony can be deterred in Allen in a
way not possible in foreign prosecutions, strengthening the Court’s overall
Fifth Amendment goal to deter the abuse of compelled testimony.68 However,
prosecutors still lack significant control in cases where U.S. authorities are
not gathering the evidence for U.S. prosecutions. As will be discussed in the
next subsection, there are also policy reasons why the receptivity of other
governments to U.S. standards should not dictate the ability of U.S. law
enforcement to prosecute a domestic case.
3. Balancing Policy Considerations
The balance of policy considerations espoused by the Balsys secondary
majority69 similarly weighs in favor of curtailing the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment in the Allen context. The Court criticizes Murphy as offering a
Panglossian declaration of the policies underpinning the privilege against
self-incrimination, rather than any sort of serious analysis. To the Murphy
Court, the Self-Incrimination Clause
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of
fair play which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load,”; our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual “to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life,”; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the
guilty,” is often “a protection to the innocent.”70

For its part, the Balsys Court argues that in this statement the Murphy Court
“does not even purport to weigh the host of competing policy concerns that would
be raised in a legitimate reconsideration of the Clause’s scope.”71 The same passage

68 See Fifth Amendment: Michigan v. Tucker, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 466, 472-73
(1974) (discussing the deterrence of law enforcement misconduct as part of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning on Fifth Amendment protections).
69 Note that Justices Thomas and Scalia declined to join Parts IV and V of the opinion, leaving
those parts at 5–4 decisions rather than 7–2. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 668 (1998).
70 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
71 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 691.
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dismisses many of the aforementioned policies as either domestically focused or
historically unsupported, more rhetorical flourish than serious policy.72
One policy argument taken up by the Balsys Court’s critique and relevant
to the Allen context is its framing of testimonial privilege more as an immunity
transaction than as an inviolable right.73 Because courts do not have the
authority to enforce immunity abroad, and given that the Kastigar decision
requires that immunity be coextensive with Fifth Amendment protections,74 it
follows that if immunity were to apply to foreign prosecutions, the government
could never offer immunity deals to defendants implicated in international
crimes.75 In the Allen context, the implications of this conception deviate
slightly based on the timeline, but the crux of the argument is the same—U.S.
authorities do not have the authority to offer immunity in a deal made by
investigators outside of U.S. control. In fact, foreign authorities can act outside
Fifth Amendment privileges during the investigative phase without any
intervention by U.S. prosecutors, and if they choose to publicize their findings
in a way that taints a U.S. investigation with compelled testimony (say, by
publishing or sending tainted information to U.S. prosecutors or key witnesses
without identifying it as such), either the entire U.S. investigation must end or
the defendant’s immunity privilege must be withdrawn. These concerns were
raised in the Department of Justice’s district court brief, which called attention
to the specter of “a hostile government bent on frustrating prosecution of a
defendant in the United States . . . compel[ling] the witness to testify and
publiciz[ing] the substance of his testimony . . . . unilaterally put[ting] the
United States to the heavy Kastigar burden.”76 The Second Circuit responded
that because the Allen case did not itself raise such concerns, the issue need
not be decided.77 However, the Second Circuit’s dismissal of this issue belies
the urgency of this flaw in its reasoning—the concerns of a hostile foreign
power manipulating our justice system are not idle. Former Vice President
Joseph Biden and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael
Carpenter recently published in Foreign Affairs an article highlighting how the
72
73

Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 692-93 (finding that, in practice, “there is a conditional protection of testimonial
privacy subject to basic limits”).
74 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (“[I]mmunity from use and derivative
use is coextensive with the scope of privilege . . . .”).
75 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Judiciary could not recognize fear of foreign prosecution
and at the same time preserve the Government’s existing rights to seek testimony in exchange for
immunity . . . .”).
76 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 11,
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
77 See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 88 (2d Cir. 2017) (“As to the Government’s concerns
that a hostile foreign government might hypothetically endeavor to sabotage U.S. prosecutions by
immunizing a suspect and publishing his or her testimony—that, of course, is not this case.”).
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Kremlin weaponizes cross-border corruption and financial crime to undermine
Western democracies.78 By dismissing this significant issue, the Second Circuit
overlooked a flaw in its attempt to establish a new blanket precedent. The same
lack of control experienced by U.S. prosecutors in an Allen hypothetical
parallels their lack of control over foreign use of American-compelled
testimony as seen in Balsys, an important policy consideration highlighted by
the Supreme Court.79
A related policy argument also rejected in Balsys is that the U.S. government’s
interest in rule of law is adequately served when defendants are convicted abroad
for their crimes, creating the same incentive for overreach that the Fifth
Amendment is meant to guard against. The Balsys Court framed the issue as
using its discretion to expand the coverage of the Fifth Amendment, premised
on the idea that it will induce our government to adopt international agreements
to protect defendants from this overreach.80 The Court nevertheless considered
the potential benefits of such policies to be uncertain, as foreign courts that do
not recognize any privilege against self-incrimination would still compel
testimony from U.S. defendants.81 Because a loss of testimony in U.S. trials
would likely result, and the countervailing benefit of protecting defendants in
foreign prosecutions is not guaranteed, the Court found that international
jurisdiction for the Self-Incrimination Clause would not effectively address any
outstanding incentives for overreach.82 The Second Circuit in Allen suggests, in
response, that the risk of defendant testimony being invalidated by foreign
compulsion should fall “on the U.S. Government (should it seek to prosecute
foreign individuals), rather than on the subjects and targets of cross-border
investigations.”83 Although this may be the policy judgment of the Second
Circuit, it does not comport with the Balsys Court’s logic in an analogous situation
that a remote threat of overreach is outweighed by competing concerns.

78 See generally Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Michael Carpenter, How to Stand Up to the Kremlin:
Defending Democracy Against Its Enemies, 97 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 44 (discussing
extensive money laundering and other cross-border criminal violations used to promote Russian
influence abroad). It is no small leap to imagine that, in shielding such activities from U.S.
prosecutorial scrutiny, the Russian government might launch its own sham corruption investigations
that would “compel” testimony and thwart U.S. efforts at justice. In such a case, the sham-nature of
the investigation might not be clear and the foreign relations implications of U.S. courts decrying
the Russian investigations might even be too steep to merit continued American pursuit of the cases
regardless of a judicial exception, subtly undermining our own rule of law.
79 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693, 697-98 (recognizing that U.S. courts cannot enforce immunity
abroad and that forcing U.S. courts to consider potential foreign immunity issues would
unacceptably inhibit U.S. prosecutors’ abilities to offer immunity deals).
80 Id. at 696-97.
81 Id. at 697.
82 Id. at 697-98.
83 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 88 (2d Cir. 2017).
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In fact, in an Allen-type scenario, the potential U.S. government incentive
for overreach is significantly less, given that foreign authorities would be
those actually compelling the testimony, leaving U.S. law enforcement a further
step removed from the compulsion, unlike in Balsys, where U.S. authorities were
themselves doing the compelling. Unless foreign authorities act specifically
under orders from U.S. authorities or otherwise engage as U.S. agents, there
would be an insufficient connection to U.S. overreach.84 Here then, the Balsys
Court’s argument favors inapplicability of the Self-Incrimination Clause to
foreign testimony. Where two governments are not working perfectly in concert,
concerns such as these inevitably arise.
B. Cooperative Internationalism as a Threshold
The Balsys secondary majority85 alternatively offers a scenario where the
same-sovereign rule could apply, postulating that foreign and U.S. authorities
might work closely enough to shift the balance of policy considerations, and
render the Self-Incrimination Clause to encompass foreign prosecutions. The
Court defines such a threshold as “cooperative internationalism.”86 The Court
recognizes that cooperative internationalism may raise concerns “[b]ecause
the Government now has a significant interest in seeing individuals convicted
abroad for their crimes, [creating] the same incentive to overreach that has
required application of the privilege in the domestic context.”87 The Balsys
Court does not explicitly instruct on when cooperative internationalism
would be considered fully realized, but suggests that if
the United States and its allies had enacted substantially similar criminal
codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international character, and if it could
be shown that the United States was granting immunity from domestic
prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other
nations as prosecutors of a crime common to both countries, then an
argument could be made that the Fifth Amendment should apply based on
fear of foreign prosecution simply because that prosecution was not fairly
characterized as distinctly “foreign.”88

84 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 694-95 (rejecting the defendant’s reasoning that foreign prosecutions
engendered “the same incentive to overreach that has required application of the privilege [against
self-incrimination] in the domestic context”).
85 In Balsys, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined five other justices for three parts of the 7–2
majority opinion. However, they declined to join the parts relevant here, leaving the Court with
only a 5–4 majority.
86 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 693.
87 Id. at 693-94.
88 Id. at 698.
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Although this high level of coordination was not found in Balsys, the case
was decided in 1999. During the intervening decades, international law
enforcement cooperation has exploded, complete with Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bodies dedicated to
coordinating domestic laws on international crimes, such as foreign corruption
and money laundering, treaties easing evidence sharing and extraditions, and
more.89 Modern international law enforcement cooperation might cause the
same court that scoffed at cross-jurisdictional coordination at the time of Balsys
to unequivocally support the assertion of full Fifth Amendment protections
beyond U.S. borders today. Notably, cooperation between the United States’
Securities and Exchange Commission, the United Kingdom’s Financial
Conduct Authority, and Canada’s Ontario Securities Commission has been
significant over the last few years. According to recent reports,
[s]uch collaboration includes sharing information, including confidential and
compelled testimony. The SEC has entered into Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) with the FCA and the OSC that provide for the
exchange of information and cooperation in overseeing corporations, and
their directors and officers, that conduct business in the respective
jurisdictions. Further, all three regulators are members of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which also provides for
mutual sharing of information . . . . The United States has also signaled its
intention to prosecute securities violations that occur extraterritorially.
Section 929P of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act affirms the SEC’s ability to bring an enforcement action
against foreign individuals for foreign conduct that has some impact on the
U.S. markets or investors.90

In this new world of formalized international cooperation and
synchronized action, courts may need to address what counts as “cooperative
internationalism,” and whether or not it carries all of the same consequences
as the Fourteenth Amendment and the same-sovereign rule when governing
immunity between state and federal prosecutions.
89 For example, the OECD maintains international standards on anti-corruption and antibribery work, complete with interjurisdictional peer reviews and multilateral surveillance to ensure
accountability. See What We Do and How, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ [https://perma.cc/Y5XH-LAXH] (listing numerous
OECD activities of cross-border scope). The U.S. Treasury Department also participates with a
number of international terrorist financing and financial crime cooperative initiatives. See Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx
[https://perma.cc/M2UA-9ZYJ] (explaining the role of the office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence in combatting terrorist financing internationally).
90 See Vukelj & Vesely, supra note 24.
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Here, the Balsys and Allen analyses could theoretically diverge, as there are
differences in assessing the degree of cooperation among international law
enforcement bodies that could be relevant to each context. The differences,
like who physically conducts the interrogations, could necessitate different
standards to establish international cooperation as a factor in determining the
admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony in U.S. courts. As
a practical matter, it is also significantly harder to ensure that meticulous U.S.
standards on information-sharing are met than it is to require U.S. prosecutors
to negotiate immunity in conjunction with their foreign counterparts.91 A full
embrace of high standards for a Balsys-type scenario could thus have
catastrophic policy implications when applied in an Allen-type scenario. Most
countries, including those currently engaged in international criminal
cooperation, may not be sufficiently equipped or coordinated with the U.S. to
handle complex firewall schemes even like the one between the U.S. and the
U.K. judged insufficient in Allen. As illustrated in Allen, many countries
protect a right against self-incrimination, but that right can protect different
behaviors and privileges than it would in the United States.92 Mistakes
happen, and prosecutors unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system but who want
to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement can reasonably be expected to err with
respect to sharing compelled testimony they gather legally under their own
laws.93 In some cases, foreign law enforcement will ignore U.S. concerns
altogether in favor of complying solely with their own laws. There is no
deterrence rationale for U.S. prosecutors in such a situation, except to
discourage complicated cooperation with foreign counterparts. In the same
91 See Sean Hecker & Karolos Seeger, The Use of Foreign Compelled Testimony in Cross-Border
Investigations—The Impact of the Second Circuit’s Allen Decision, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
LEGAL GUIDE TO: BUSINESS CRIME 2018 9, 13 (Global Legal Group ed., 8th ed. Sept. 2017), https://
www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2017/09/the-use-of-foreign-compelled-testimony (“Given the
potential pitfalls [of coordinating international law enforcement cooperation], if the DOJ is not able to
take the lead on these cases from the beginning, it may opt not to pursue them at all.”); Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, LLP, October 2017: Second Circuit Immunity Decision Upends Cross-Border Criminal
Investigations, JD SUPRA (Nov. 2, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=9296f878-b71c-4c48b045-0573972bfb32&pddocfullpath=
%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5PW0-YWN1-JCMN-Y3VK-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=299488&pdalertresultid=732694180&pdalertprofileid=213f1a06-a317-407f9899-fc09463b0151&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true [https://perma.cc/NZL2-LBPT] (highlighting
that the Allen decision could place a significantly heavier burden on U.S. prosecutors in every
investigation where other law enforcement authorities have the legal right to compel testimony).
92 See generally G. Arthur Martin et al., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Foreign
Law, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 161 (1960) (discussing the nuances of the
privilege against self-incrimination as it exists in the legal systems of multiple countries).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding admissible
statements gathered by a Peruvian law enforcement officer, trained in the United States and aware
of U.S. law, who chose only to follow Peruvian law and ignore American Miranda warnings and
right to counsel after an arrest).
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spirit as the warnings of the Balsys Court, this position unduly burdens law
enforcement trying to prosecute internationally mobile criminals and hurts
executive branch foreign relations efforts, cutting off potentially fruitful
cooperation where U.S. prosecutors fear accidental taint by their foreign
counterparts. For foreign countries, because there is no analog to the Fourteenth
Amendment in Malloy directly linking a foreign government’s legal obligations
to the U.S. government’s, this easily becomes an issue of sovereignty.
Overall, it is worth noting that the Balsys decision has been panned in
academic circles as misreading Murphy and other precedential cases,94 and as
flouting international norms and law.95 The case, which comes in a line of
precedent that has seesawed between Murdock’s narrowness and Murphy’s
blanket coverage, is not the last word on self-incrimination. However, the
case does provide relevant guidance when considering the U.S. trial
admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony.
III. OTHER RELEVANT COMPARISONS
Because of the dearth of case law on this issue, it is useful to draw lessons
through comparison. Three components of current law are especially salient
to the Allen context: 1) the implied applicability of Bram v. United States96 and
that dicta’s acceptance by future Courts, 2) case law surrounding the
admissibility of Miranda warnings, and 3) an analogous body like Congress
compelling testimony as seen in United States v. North.97 While there is no
clear path to determine the international reach of the Fifth Amendment,
weighing these considerations can guide a new framework for determining
the admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony.
A. Assuming Applicability of the Fifth Amendment to Foreign Testimony
Dicta from Bram, and, building from it, United States v. Orlandez-Gamboa98
and Brulay v. United States99, suggest that the Fifth Amendment is applicable
to foreign government–compelled testimony. In Bram, Canadian authorities
94 See, e.g., Steven J. Winger, Note, Denying Fifth Amendment Protections to Witnesses Facing Foreign
Prosecutions: Self-Incrimination Discrimination?, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1095, 1129-37 (1999)
(analyzing the failure of Balsys to adhere to controlling precedents and to give sufficient emphasis to
essential policies advanced by the Self-Incrimination Clause).
95 Dianne Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA J.
INT’L. & COMP. L. 555, 562-63 (2000) (implying that Balsys reflects the absence of international
norms considered in U.S. constitutional interpretation).
96 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
97 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn & superseded in part on reh’g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
98 320 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2003).
99 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967).
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coerced a confession in Canada from a suspected murderer before handing him
over to U.S. prosecutors.100 The Court held that the confession was
inadmissible because it was compelled, taking for granted that Fifth
Amendment protections would apply to such evidence though obtained
independently by foreign authorities.101 Bram is the closest Supreme Court
case to parallel the situation in Allen, but dicta from 1897 cannot definitively
address the issue of foreign government–compelled testimony, particularly as
Balsys might point in the opposite direction.
Drawing on Bram, the Second Circuit Orlandez-Gamboa case involved a
Colombian drug cartel leader voluntarily admitting guilt and giving details about
his dealings to Colombian prosecutors as part of a Colombian reduced-sentencing
scheme.102 After meetings with the defendant, Colombian prosecutors amended
the charges to make him eligible for extradition to the United States and for
prosecution by U.S. authorities for those crimes.103 After extensive discussion,
the U.S. court found Federal Rule of Evidence 410(4) inapplicable overseas and
then conducted a voluntariness analysis under the Fifth Amendment, citing
Bram as precedent but without any discussion on the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment overseas.104 The juxtaposition of extensive international analysis on
Rule 410(4) without any on the Fifth Amendment suggests either that the court
in Orlandez-Gamboa similarly ignored the extraterritorial issue, or, more likely,
implicitly accepted Bram’s dicta. Interestingly, Orlandez-Gamboa was decided by
Judge Guido Calabresi, the same judge who wrote the overturned opinion from
Balsys five years earlier.105 Courts’ previous silence adds little to the argument, a
point tacitly made in the government’s reply brief which neglected any mention
of Orlandez-Gamboa.106
The Ninth Circuit in Brulay v. United States took a slightly different tactic
in its analysis of Bram’s dicta. In Brulay, Mexican officials detained a defendant,
seized his amphetamine pills, questioned him, and ultimately extracted
incriminating statements and evidence from him without the use of any
100
101

Bram, 168 U.S. at 537.
Id. at 541, 565 (concluding that “an influence was exerted” and “error was committed by the
trial court in admitting the confession under the circumstances disclosed by the record”).
102 Orlandez-Gamboa, 320 F.3d at 329.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 332 (holding that Gamboa’s admissions, though potentially inadmissible as evidence
under Rule 410(4) because they were made during negotiations concerning his sentence, were
admissible because the rule had no extraterritorial applicability).
105 United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1997), rev’d 524 U.S. 666 (1998). Calabresi
argued in Balsys that there was no “significant difference in the harm to governmental interests from
granting the privilege to those who fear foreign prosecutions, and to those who fear domestic
prosecution, because the reasons for allowing the privilege are similar in both situations, and because
the language of the amendment does not distinguish between the two . . . .” Id. at 140.
106 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at iv,
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
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coercion.107 The court’s analysis distinguishes between the Fourth Amendment,
whose protections do not apply to actions by foreign officials, and the Fifth
Amendment, whose protections do apply per Bram.108 The Court briefly cites
to the same timing rationale of Chavez,109 which is of limited utility without
further probing as discussed in subsection II.A.1 of this Comment. In these
cases and in others like them, the Bram silence is instructive but, particularly
without any deeper analysis of the issue, not controlling.
B. Admissibility of Foreign Testimony Without Miranda Warnings
One scenario where courts have extensively discussed the admissibility of
foreign-compelled testimony is in the case law surrounding police interrogations
and their attendant Miranda warnings. Many cases address situations where U.S.
authorities interrogate suspects abroad, foreign authorities interrogate suspects
abroad using torture or coercion, or foreign authorities do not give suspects
Miranda warnings but proceed to extract information from suspects voluntarily.
Each iteration presents a different constitutionality analysis, but all trace back to
standards focused on 1) voluntariness and, more broadly, 2) due process.
1. Analyzing a Voluntariness Standard
Where U.S. authorities are heavily involved, constitutional protections
attach. As such, interrogations conducted abroad by U.S. officials trigger Fifth
Amendment Miranda protections to the extent practicable.110 Where foreign
authorities conduct the interrogation, voluntary non-Mirandized testimony
under the Fifth Amendment can still be admissible where it is 1) not the
product of a joint venture between U.S. and foreign authorities, and 2) not a
product of tactics that “shock the judicial conscience.”111

107
108

Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 348-49 n.5 (discussing the inapplicability of Fourth Amendment protections due to a
lack of deterrent effect on U.S. law enforcement and the applicability of Fifth Amendment
protections because they are triggered by the entrance of evidence into trial).
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding
that a bombing suspect questioned abroad by foreign and then U.S. authorities was entitled to be
Mirandized prior to the interrogation by U.S. authorities).
111 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “statements obtained
under circumstances that ‘shock the judicial conscience’ will be suppressed”); see also Fred Medick,
Exporting Miranda: Protecting the Right Against Self-Incrimination when U.S. Officers Perform Custodial
Interrogations Abroad, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 173, 185-86 (2009) (describing the two major
exceptions to the rule that Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination do not protect
suspects questioned by foreign agents abroad); cf. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th
Cir. 1976) (remarking that appellate courts may exercise their discretionary powers to exclude
evidence obtained through extreme foreign searches and seizures).
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The joint venture and “shocks the conscience” exceptions are not of
particular relevance in an Allen-type context. The joint venture doctrine has
been articulated by a number of Circuit Courts,112 though no test for what
constitutes a “joint venture” has been universally adopted.113 It seems to
underpin the Balsys call for a standard of “cooperative internationalism”
discussed in Section II.B of this Comment. The joint venture doctrine is
informative in cases with close international cooperation but is not dispositive
as to the admissibility of foreign-compelled testimony writ large. The “shocks
the conscience” doctrine also does not apply in an Allen-type context. Many
of these cases directly address coerced confessions through alleged torture.114
By contrast, in Allen, U.K. authorities did nothing to “shock the conscience”
of a U.S. court or otherwise coerce defendants.115 Moreover, it seems an odd
contradiction that only voluntary statements taken in such a way as to shock
judicial conscience are excluded from evidence, because arguably any such
statement should be prima facie involuntary under the applicable definitions
of voluntary discussed below.116 In an Allen-type case then, the key parallel to
the Miranda cases centers on only the voluntariness question.
Read aggressively, the voluntariness standard could constitutionally
invalidate all foreign government–compelled testimony.117 The first order
question, then, is whether a voluntariness standard applies at all. Although it
has been commonly assumed that it does,118 that has not previously been
112 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d 494 U.S.
259 (1990) (identifying cases in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that all
engage joint venture doctrine). Although these are Fourth Amendment cases, the joint venture
doctrine analysis is the same under both Amendments. See e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S.
Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 203 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the joint venture doctrine in the
context of Fifth Amendment claims).
113 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1225. (“The few courts that have considered the question of how
much American participation in a foreign search and seizure is required to mandate application of the
exclusionary rule have not been unanimous in their choice of the precise test to be applied—though
they have as a statistical matter been virtually unanimous in rejecting claims of undue participation.”
(quoting United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir.1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 227-28, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming
the district court’s finding that defendant’s statements were voluntary because he was not subject to
torture, and finding no credible evidence that there was “improper collaboration” between Saudi
and U.S. officials in defendant’s detention); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 144 (holding that defendant waived
his argument—that his post-arrest statements were coerced as a result of torture—when he failed to
raise the argument in a pre-trial suppression motion).
115 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he defendant’s testimony was
compelled by foreign officials lawfully—that is, pursuant to foreign legal process—in a manner that
does not shock the conscience or violate fundamental fairness.”).
116 The Second Circuit acknowledged this “far-fetched” scenario and backpedaled from its
“shocks the conscience” exception in the Allen decision. Allen, 864 F.3d at 84 n.90.
117 Indeed, this is the intended outcome of the Second Circuit’s Allen decision. See id. at 82.
118 See, e.g., Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227-28 (“[V]oluntary statements obtained from a defendant by
foreign law enforcement officers, even without Miranda warnings, generally are admissible.”); Kilday
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explicitly held, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out in United States v. Straker.119
Assuming it does, courts need to address the definition of involuntariness and
whether it encapsulates legal foreign compulsion (as in Allen) in addition to
coercion. If involuntariness includes both, courts need to decide whether to
carve out an exception to admit such involuntary statements compelled in
accordance with foreign law without coercion. The current voluntariness
standard is a reflection of the ambiguous evolution of Fifth Amendment due
process jurisprudence,120 so arguments about its applicability are not clear cut.
The emphasis on voluntariness by courts does not necessarily imply that
involuntary statements legally compelled by foreign officials are never
admissible. United States v. Yousef121, an oft-cited case in the foreign interrogation
space, evidences the contradictions that can arise from this disconnect. Yousef was
a Second Circuit terrorism case related to the 1993 World Trade Center
bombings, where questioning occurred on foreign soil, first by local authorities
and then by U.S. officials.122 The court found Miranda warnings irrelevant to the
admissibility of evidence from foreign police interrogations where the
defendant’s statements were voluntary.123 However, Yousef and similar cases
(including all nine cited by the Second Circuit as evidence that this question is
already settled124) never addressed the core issue of an arguably involuntary
v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he statements were not coerced . . . . The
evidence was therefore admissible.”).
119 United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 614 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“We have never decided
what standard determines the admissibility of statements obtained abroad by foreign police officers,
though it has been suggested that the ordinary voluntariness standard governs.”).
120 See GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE, FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS 1536-38 (2014)
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014-10-6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BNG3-FRGM] [hereinafter FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS] (documenting
the evolution of the voluntariness standard and due process under the Self-Incrimination Clause).
121 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
122 Id. at 78-83.
123 Id. at 145. Note that the government’s Allen brief also raises the idea that Yousef was based on
questionable case law. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar
at 21, 21 n.9, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
124 See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 80 nn.67-68 (2d Cir. 2017). The citations from the
Second Circuit opinion are Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S.
Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 200 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d
970, 972 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974); Kilday v. United
States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); and
Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5 (9th Cir. 1967). Bram and Brulay are both discussed in
Section III.A of this Comment as implying Fifth Amendment applicability without any analysis on
the issue. Abu Ali, In re Terrorist Bombings, Yousef, and Kilday all address the coercion issue with regards
to Miranda warnings and are cited in subsection III.B.1. Welch, Wolf, and Mundt deal with similar
coercion questions from Miranda warnings case law, and are far from dispositive here. Welch relies
explicitly on the Bram dicta as a basis for excluding involuntary statements, but finds that a lack of
Miranda warnings was not sufficient grounds for exclusion. 455 F.2d at 213. Mundt analyzes statements
for involuntariness on the basis of whether they involved “threats or coercion . . . deprivation of food,
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statement taken by foreign officials without coercion, ignoring a potential
distinction between coerced and compelled statements.125
As alluded to in the government brief in Allen,126 the Supreme Court in
Colorado v. Connelly recognizes the importance of “coercive activity of the
State” as the catalyst for a finding of involuntariness.127 In domestic case law,
coercion can be as simple as threatening to fire an employee.128 When
referencing involuntariness in the foreign interrogation context, the example
cases cited in Yousef refer to circumstances that involve extreme physical
harm.129 Courts in other foreign interrogation cases have envisioned
involuntariness as physical or psychological coercion, meaning beatings less
than torture, extended detentions, keeping defendants ignorant of their rights,
and otherwise wearing down their physical and mental wellbeing.130
Interestingly, most of the examples involve recently apprehended individuals
detained and questioned alone. All of this is a far cry from white collar formal
judicial proceedings, where the compelled individuals have lawyers, like in
Allen.131 Without a full interrogation of involuntariness, this foreign
sleep or toilet facilities.” 508 F.2d at 906. Wolf involves allegations of coercion by a threat of “physical
violence.” 813 F.2d at 972. Of note, Yousef and In re Terrorist Bombings are both decisions by Judge
Cabranes, who wrote the final Second Circuit Allen opinion.
125 This issue was originally raised in the DOJ’s Allen brief. See Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 21, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d
684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (“[The relevant cases don’t] address[] the admissibility
of potentially involuntary statements taken by foreign officials.”). However, the Second Circuit
rejected the argument. Allen, 864 F.3d at 82 (“[W]e have often referred to the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition against illicit use as encompassing ‘involuntary,’ rather than ‘compelled,’ statements. But
this semantic distinction does not bear significant, much less dispositive, weight.”).
126 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 21 n.9,
United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (“[T]he
introduction of evidence into a judicial proceeding does not by itself satisfy the ‘state action’
requirement for triggering the constitutional protection against involuntary confessions.”).
127 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
128 See Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 868, 868 n.29 (1995) (summarizing case law finding termination of
government employment to be unconstitutional compulsion).
129 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (identifying the rubbing of pepper
in the eyes as conduct that “shocks the judicial conscience,” warranting suppression (citing United
States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970))).
130 See e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (analyzing the defendant’s
voluntariness in the context of his subjection to physical or psychological coercion, highlighting that
he was not blindfolded, shackled, or denied basic necessities during his interrogation); In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 177, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing to the
intellectual capabilities and lack of threats or promises to the defendant as evidence his statements
were voluntary); United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding an
absence of coercion where the defendant faced interrogation sessions of reasonable duration, was not
handcuffed, was confident and well-educated, and received breaks for basic needs).
131 The distinction is made explicit in Abu Ali, where the court rejected the defendant’s
constitutional claim for suppression of statements he made in Saudi custody. Although the
defendant was not provided legal protections like prompt presentment and Miranda warnings in
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compulsion/coercion distinction is ignored. An Allen-type situation, where
that distinction could decide the case, highlights the importance of thoroughly
considering the admissibility of foreign, legally compelled statements.
The four primary concerns with a voluntariness standard generally suggest that
Allen-type foreign-compelled testimony should be admissible, either as voluntary
testimony or as an exception to the voluntariness standard, but there is significant
room for disagreement. The concerns are 1) upholding the moral rationales for the
Fifth Amendment, 2) respecting foreign sovereignty, 3) recognizing the limited
deterrence impacts, and 4) determining the reliability of evidence gathered
through self-incrimination. The moral justifications for the Fifth Amendment
are robust but not particularly well-defined.132 They include protecting
individuals from the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusing, perjury, or contempt;
safeguarding the mental privacy of the accused; and respecting the integrity of
the individual by not turning him into an “instrument” to be used against himself;
among others.133 Although the Supreme Court in Balsys rejected similar notions
as Pollyannaish,134 the moral concerns are real where foreign governments compel
testimony. Fifth Amendment protection itself is not absolute, as individuals can
trade immunity for testimony, but immunity eliminates the moral quandary of
the trilemma. Where foreign governments do not offer such relief, there may be
serious moral questions about whether their compelled testimony, even in
accordance with their justice system, should be admitted.
The issue of respecting foreign sovereignty weighs towards admitting
foreign-compelled statements. Foreign affairs is traditionally left by courts to
the executive branch,135 and imposing strict admissibility standards on
foreign-compelled testimony would hinder U.S. international law
enforcement cooperation and U.S. relations where foreign and U.S.
authorities were independently pursuing related crimes. The costs would
come as they did in Allen, with the U.S. government forced to expend
significant financial and diplomatic capital training foreign partners in how
to assist U.S. officials in their constitutional compliance.136 The struggle
comes where foreign legal systems allow for procedures that, to American
eyes, look patently unjust. In those cases, respecting foreign sovereignty in
American courts is a more complex question, but one that arguably remains
accordance with the U.S. Constitution, the court saw “the absence of these protections as [merely]
one factor in the totality of circumstances in evaluating whether Abu Ali made his statements
voluntarily,” in deference to Saudi Arabian sovereignty. 528 F.3d at 233.
132 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 128, at 889-90 (“None of the rationales typically given for
the Self-Incrimination Clause can satisfactorily explain the current scope of the privilege and its
relation to the rest of our legal and moral system.”).
133 Id. at 889-92 (discussing various rationales for the Fifth Amendment).
134 See supra subsection II.A.3.
135 See supra note 67.
136 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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in the realm of foreign affairs and the executive branch.137 Out of respect for
the judicial systems of other countries, or at least those with similar legal
systems, there is an argument that testimony following their judicial
procedures should be admitted.
The deterrence rationale, which doesn’t seem to apply here, is often cited
in the Miranda cases for admitting voluntary, non-Mirandized statements.
Because the United States cannot compel a foreign sovereign to follow U.S.
constitutional requirements in their investigations, enforcing the requirement
would have no deterrent effect on law enforcement overreach.138 In cases like
Allen, the same rationale applies because foreign governments cannot
generally be expected to forego privileges under their own laws out of
deference to U.S. law enforcement investigations. Under certain
circumstances, U.S. prosecutors may persuade friendly foreign authorities to
follow protocols designed to preserve Fifth Amendment protections, but this
is an unrealistic expectation where U.S. prosecutors do not have complete
control over governmental actions related to the U.S. prosecutors’ evidence
and witnesses.139 As has consistently been held with Miranda warnings, a
foreign law enforcement body, which is not bound by the Fifth Amendment
or any other U.S. constitutional provisions, simply will not be deterred by U.S.
standards on voluntariness, and neither will U.S. authorities be deterred from
unconstitutional conduct by imposing this burden on an independent party.
At the same time, the voluntariness issue in Allen is distinct from Miranda
warnings because it speaks directly to the reliability of the evidence in
question.140 Where robust immunity, like that available under the U.S.
Constitution, is not granted to the accused, they remain highly incentivized to
perjure themselves. Although an Allen situation does not threaten the type of
coerced false confessions that originated self-incrimination protections,141 it

137 The U.S. legal system encourages weighing the credibility of testimony at trial, but the
potential for prejudice such evidence represents could outweigh any value it provided at trial.
138 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“The purpose of excluding evidence
seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the
Constitution.”). See, e.g., Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the
U.S. Constitution cannot compel foreign sovereigns to take specific actions); United States v. Welch,
455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972) (acknowledging that Miranda requirements have almost no deterrent
effect on foreign police officers); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1971)
(“[T]he exclusionary rule has little or no effect upon the conduct of foreign police.”).
139 Cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text.
140 See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 21
n.9, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR) (“[A] court
‘must exclude’ an involuntary statement ‘because of its inherent unreliability.’” (quoting United
States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972))).
141 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 128, at 923 (highlighting the high probability of unreliable
confessions in 1789). See generally FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS, supra note 120
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still distorts incentives to honesty that our justice system generally
promotes.142 As previously mentioned, countries with seemingly unjust legal
practices could also taint the reliability of evidence even where collected in
accordance with their own due process procedures. The right answers are far
from clear, as is the weight this voluntariness distinction should be granted
when evaluating the admissibility of foreign government–compelled
testimony. However, current case law leaves open the possibility of a legal
distinction between compelled and coerced testimony, and there are policy
reasons relevant to voluntariness that weigh toward making such a distinction.
2. Due Process Under the Self-Incrimination Clause
Within a voluntary analysis and without, the core constitutional issue is
whether defendants receive due process. The Self-Incrimination Clause reads
that no accused person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . . without due process of law.”143 A plain text reading of the
Clause suggests that once a person has received due process, she can be forced to
testify against herself. From a purely textualist perspective then, Allen-type
situations hinge on whether another country’s administration of its own formal
due process, which doesn’t perfectly map onto American due process
jurisprudence, creates the type of involuntariness that would render such
testimony inadmissible. The Supreme Court has held that due process guarantees
not particular forms of procedures, but the very substance of individual rights
to life, liberty, and property . . . . It follows that any legal proceeding enforced
by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public
good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must
be held to be due process of law . . . . In all cases, that kind of procedure is due
process of law which is suitable and proper to the nature of the case, and
sanctioned by the established customs and usages of the courts. What is unfair
in one situation may be fair in another. The precise nature of the interest that
has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons
for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the
protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is

(discussing the history of the self-incrimination privilege and referencing that six states after the
American Revolution included protections against self-incrimination in their constitutions).
142 For example, through laws against perjury and oaths to tell the truth taken by witnesses.
143 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished—these
are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.144

Foreign legal systems, like the UK government and the authority it grants
the FCA, arguably meet this broad definition of due process when they
compel self-incrimination. To be sure, not all foreign governments will, and
for both political and practical reasons it is hard to draw a line between those
governments that evince due process and those that don’t. Managing such
inconsistencies is difficult, but it is an important consideration for a
voluntariness standard and for the ultimate question of constitutionality of
foreign government procedures.
C. Congressionally Compelled Testimony
A final, potentially fruitful comparison comes from United States v.
North,145 which analyzes protections against self-incrimination in the context
of compelled testimony during a congressional investigation. 146 North offers
one example of constitutional protections constraining a non-traditional law
enforcement actor outside of the executive branch, potentially useful when
situating foreign authorities on the broad spectrum of standards of conduct
constitutionally prescribed to different entities.147 For example, while
investigations by public employers also invoke Fifth Amendment
protections,148 courts have rejected any privilege in the context of private
employers or other private parties.149 As attempted by the Second Circuit in

144 FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS OF PERSONS, supra note 120, at 1546 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing to multiple accepted Supreme Court precedents regarding the definition of due process).
145 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh’g, 920 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
146 While the North cases are discussed in relation to Allen, none of the Allen case materials
considered the constitutional parallels between foreign governments and Congress in depth, instead
focusing on North’s implications for the taint wall in this case. See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d
63, 93 (2d Cir. 2017) (analyzing the Government’s ability to meet its Kastigar burden based on the
North standard). In North, the standard put forward was a “total prohibition” on prosecutorial
exposure to immunized testimony, including the most tenuous witness exposure. United States v.
North, 920 F.2d 940, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
147 Other courts criticize the strictness with which the D.C. Circuit in North applied standards
for judging taint, potentially limiting the universality of this analysis. See Amar & Lettow, supra
note 128, at 879-80.
148 See J. Michael McGuinness, Fifth Amendment Protection for Public Employees: Garrity and Limited
Constitutional Protections from Use of Employer Coerced Statements in Internal Investigations and Practical
Considerations, 24 TOURO L. REV. 697, 705-09 (2008) (describing Fifth Amendment protections for
public sector workers established by the Supreme Court in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)).
149 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“The most outrageous behavior by a
private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.”).
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Allen, foreign officials must now be situated within this spectrum,150 and North
provides a useful analogy.151
In North, congressional testimony compelled through a grant of immunity
under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 was given during a recess of grand jury proceedings.152
Pertinent to the highly publicized Iran–Contra scandal,153 the immunized
testimony was widely broadcast by media outlets and deemed sufficient to
taint the grand jurors and witnesses.154 Prior to North, the Supreme Court had
made clear that Fifth Amendment protections apply to testimony before
legislative committees.155 Under § 6002, Congress can unilaterally grant
criminal immunity for statements made in its committee hearings to compel
self-incriminating testimony.156 Although § 6002 is a statutory protection, the
protection is coextensive with constitutional Fifth Amendment protections.157
North highlights the uncertain status of a foreign government, as opposed to
a domestic government entity, compelling testimony that might impact U.S.
trials. Based on North’s espoused values of resisting tyranny and avoiding the
cruel expediency of forcing a confession,158 foreign officials should be covered
by Fifth Amendment protections. Congress and foreign authorities are similar
in that both are government entities with sovereign powers that can induce the
150
151

Allen, 864 F.3d at 84-85.
This Comment intentionally ignores the Department of Justice’s analogy of a foreign government
to the private sector because it was well developed in the record and the Second Circuit compellingly
distinguishes sovereign power from the power of a private entity. The Second Circuit stated:
Only sovereign power exposes “those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Only the U.K. government could have
immunized Defendants (neither of whom were employed by Rabobank at the time),
compelling them to testify or go to jail. To the extent there may be an “official/private
action spectrum,” when foreign authorities compel testimony they are acting in the
quintessence of their sovereign authority, not in their capacity as a mere employer,
and thus their compulsion is cognizable by the Fifth Amendment (when testimony so
compelled is used in a U.S. trial).
Id. at 85 (emphasis in original) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964); and then quoting Geoffrey S. Corn & Kevin Cieply, The Admissibility of Confessions
Compelled by Foreign Coercion: A Compelling Question of Values in an Era of Increasing International
Criminal Cooperation, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 467, 476 (2015)).
152 United States v. North, 910 F.2d, 843, 851, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
153 See id. at 851 (detailing the establishment of congressional investigations following public
revelations of U.S. arms sales to Iran to fund guerrilla fighters in Nicaragua).
154 See id. at 863-65, 871-73 (remanding the case and requiring the prosecution to affirmatively
prove that the DOJ’s investigation was not tainted by witness, prosecutor, and grand juror exposure
to publicly broadcast testimony). The decision was upheld by United States v. North, 910 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
155 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1957) (recognizing the privilege against
self-incrimination before a legislative committee).
156 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994).
157 North, 910 F.2d at 853-54 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)).
158 Id.
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imprisonment of individuals.159 Both are similarly situated vis-à-vis U.S. law
enforcement authorities in that neither holds formal law enforcement powers in
the U.S. justice system but both can coordinate formally with U.S. federal law
enforcement. Finally, both presumably share the previously decried incentive
towards tyranny and overreach of authority stemming from their efforts to
govern, maintain their political legitimacy, and bring criminals to justice.
At the same time, there are significant differences between Congress and
foreign authorities relevant to an Allen-type analysis. The level of internal
control or coordination present within the U.S. government is (hopefully)
stronger than external coordination, where it is relatively uncommon to
consider foreign law enforcement as engaged in a “joint venture” with U.S.
authorities.160 Here, Congress was able to pass § 6002 specifically immunizing
testimony it receives, binding and directing U.S. law enforcement action in a
way that foreign partners can’t and shouldn’t. In addition, contempt of
Congress charges allow Congress to use U.S. law to imprison or otherwise
pressure individuals into compliance with congressional subpoenas through
judicial and executive branch cooperation, suggesting a significant level of
coordination not available to foreign law enforcement.161
The disconnect here highlights a key distinction between U.S. and
international entities and their prerogatives. Like U.S. law enforcement
authorities, Congress serves American interests. Foreign authorities do not.
Diverging goals can mean different targets for prosecution and different
perspectives on the legality or culpability of actions, even where our
countries’ policy incentives are somewhat aligned.162 The factual setup of
North presents an illustrative hypothetical.163 If the Nicaraguan National
Assembly had broadcast the incriminating statements relevant in North
instead of the U.S. Congress, U.S. prosecutors could similarly find their
prosecutorial efforts scuttled, but this time in the interests of another country,
159 See, e.g., TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT
POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE,
AND PROCEDURE 11 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ND52WZT] (discussing penalties, including imprisonment, for convictions of contempt of Congress as
initiated by congressional investigators).
160 Joint ventures under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence trigger enhanced constitutional
protections for defendants. See Amy E. Pope, Lawlessness Breeds Lawlessness: A Case for Applying the
Fourth Amendment to Extraterritorial Searches, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1917, 1926-29 (2013).
161 See supra note 91 (discussing the practical difficulties of convincing non-U.S. entities to
voluntarily adhere to robust U.S. legal standards); note 149 (addressing a parallel context in which
Congress was able to use its statutorily granted authority, which would be enforced by the U.S.
executive and judicial branches of government, to compel testimony).
162 Clearly the concerns are even greater when dealing with a hostile nation. See supra notes
77–79 and accompanying text.
163 Interestingly, this is the type of concerning hypothetical the Second Circuit declined to
analyze in United States v. Allen. 864 F.3d 63, 86 (2d Cir. 2017).

2018]

A New Hurdle to International Cooperation

819

rather than for an American conception of justice. Under this analogy, the
extension of Fifth Amendment protections would hinge on our trust in the
good faith of foreign partners and the consideration they will show to
American interests in justice. As such, the answers congressional compulsion
provides on the ultimate Allen constitutionality issue are limited.
North highlights the gray area between government and third-party
compulsion into which foreign governments seem to fall, recalling from Balsys
the idea of a threshold measure for finding cooperative internationalism.164
Although analogous cases are useful, there are no perfect comparisons to
guide an analysis of the admissibility of foreign government–compelled
testimony in U.S. trials outside of the Second Circuit’s Allen decision.
IV. EXAMINING SOLUTIONS
In light of the underdeveloped doctrine surrounding foreign
government–compelled testimony and its admissibility in U.S. prosecutions,
courts will soon need to articulate clearer legal standards to handle this issue.
I assess six possible solutions along an approximate spectrum of the least to
the most aggressive enforcement of the self-incrimination privilege: A)
interpreting to its extreme the DOJ’s Allen position that the privilege against
self-incrimination should not apply abroad; B) allowing for testimony
gathered in accordance with local laws; C) allowing for testimony where U.S.
prosecutors made reasonable efforts to avoid taint under U.S. constitutional
standards; D) creating a “cooperative internationalism” standard; E)
establishing a hybrid option from these paths that I recommend to best balance
constitutional concerns; and F) maintaining the Second Circuit’s outright
prohibition on testimony that does not meet U.S. constitutional standards.
Some of these standards offer more practicable, fair outcomes than others, and
some offer positive elements that I attempt to incorporate into the broader
hybrid option. Above all, the six solutions highlight that administering proper
justice can require coming to terms with the fact that justice does not always
lend itself to black-and-white rules. As one example, the Second Circuit’s
acknowledgment that its standard specifically does not address a
government-posed hypothetical of foreign sabotage exposes its weakness as an
ostensibly universal standard.165 In the context of self-incrimination abroad,
the challenge is finding clear standards that fit all contexts.

164
165

See supra Section II.B.
Allen, 864 F.3d at 88 (rejecting the Government’s concerns about foreign sabotage as not
relevant to the Allen case specifically when ruling on the admissibility of compelled testimony).
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A. Declining to Apply U.S. Constitutional Protections Abroad
An extreme approach courts could take would be to allow all testimony
from abroad, compelled and otherwise, into U.S. trials. This is not a likely
nor advisable scenario, for the very reasons this Comment has struggled to
define how best to serve American policy prerogatives—the admissibility of
compelled testimony is a complex and ethically fraught issue. The option is
important to include as a starting point in the spectrum of potential courses
of action for U.S. courts, but its utility ends there given the American value
placed on constitutional protections.
B. Basing Self-Incrimination on the Laws of Foreign Partners
One potential line is where foreign governments have an equivalent to the
U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, U.S. authorities would be expected to
use only testimony that meets the other government’s legal standards. Such a
standard would guard against the moral concerns about foreign sovereigns who
entirely lack protections, raised in subsection III.B.1, because a U.S. court would
still determine whether the foreign sovereign offered protections sufficient to
be considered “due process.” Once that threshold is met, the standard could be
similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)166 context, where the
government can only prosecute bribes that would also be considered bribery
under both the law of the foreign country and under the FCPA.167 By adapting
our law to that of foreign countries, we would eliminate the possibility that a
hostile government could manipulate their own laws to obstruct a U.S.
prosecution.168 In addition, we would be effectively balancing the policy
consideration that foreign relations, including telling other countries how to
conduct their criminal investigations, should be left to the political branches.169

166
167

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1–dd-3 (2012).
Established by Congress in 1988, the FCPA “Local Law Defense” requires the defendant
“establish that the payment was lawful under the foreign country’s written laws and regulations at
the time of the offense.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ENF’T
DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 23 (Nov. 14, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AYK-DBA4].
168 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
169 See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 697 (1998) (highlighting that powers with respect
to foreign relations are specifically enumerated to the political branches under Article II, § 2, cl. 2
of the U.S. Constitution). Note that this is also the rationale used for courts to sidestep scrutiny of
extraditions to foreign partners on the basis of torture or other unconstitutional
procedures/treatment. See John T. Parry, International Extradition, The Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the
Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 1975 (2010). As such, a local law deference standard
would be consistent with U.S. policy in other contexts.
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At the same time, because different governments conceive of the
protection against self-incrimination in dramatically different ways,170 Fifth
Amendment protections would be left open to confusion and vulnerable to
circumvention by close international law enforcement cooperation, especially
if the “due process” sufficiency standard was overly relaxed. In Allen there was
significant discussion of the nature of immunity offered by U.K. regulators to
Robson and the requirement that he review what in the U.S. would be
considered tainted testimony.171 Such fact-specific nuances would then impact
testimony’s Fifth Amendment protections, forcing U.S. prosecutors to argue
the intricacies of other countries’ privileges against self-incrimination.172
Worse, U.S. prosecutors could instruct their foreign counterparts to ask a list
of specific questions prohibited by the Fifth Amendment but allowed under
their own laws, and then send the answers to U.S. prosecutors. If a foreign
partner did not have what judges would consider sufficient “due process”
protections, this proposal could preclude formal cooperation and evidence
sharing altogether. Human rights advocates might argue this to be a positive
outcome, including its resulting pressure on regimes without due process, but
it puts a tremendous strain on U.S. law enforcement where they attempt to
hold criminals accountable already taking advantage of other countries’ rule of
law challenges.173 Furthermore, this approach would condition American
constitutional rights on the laws of other countries, which would have negative
implications for our sovereignty and the strength and consistency of our
constitutional protections. Taken alone then, this option creates serious
problems for the sanctity of American values.

170
171

See supra note 92.
See United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp.3d 684, 688-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that the ruling
in Kastigar affords “immunity from both direct use and derivative use of [their] compelled testimony”).
172 Certainly prosecutors could get official advisory opinions from their foreign counterparts under
current practice, but the struggle of parsing out the nuance in whether other countries have “substantially
similar” immunity practices and whether those practices are “substantially similar” in a particular case
would create significant fact-specific uncertainty. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492
(9th Cir. 1987) (allowing for a good faith exception where U.S. authorities relied on assurances of
propriety from counterparts in the Philippines); United States v. Ramcharan, No. 04-20065-CRSEITZ,
2008 WL 170377, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008), aff ’d, 353 F. App’x 419 (11th Cir. 2009) (observing that
U.S. officials properly relied on assurances about Bahamanian wiretap law from local authorities).
173 For example, U.S. law enforcement often cooperates with Saudi Arabian and Israeli
authorities on national security issues that can turn into criminal prosecutions. If either country was
judged to compel testimony in contravention of due process protections, U.S. prosecutors might shy
away from partnerships fearing that compelled testimony they gathered might taint a future U.S.
criminal investigation or U.S. witnesses at trial.

822

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 789

C. Allowing Testimony After Reasonable Efforts Against Taint
Alternatively, formal law enforcement cooperation in investigations could
be exempted from scrutiny as long as U.S. investigators do not intentionally
direct foreign investigators to obtain evidence that would otherwise be
considered unconstitutional. An underlying assumption of this policy would
be that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies abroad,
but reasonable best efforts by prosecutors to avoid compelled testimony could
cure otherwise irreparably tainted testimony. In the Allen case, rather than a
full separate filter team of attorneys174, the Department of Justice might have
satisfied their burden with, perhaps as one example, clear and consistent
requests to Robson that he not share information from the Conti and Allen
transcripts, as well as meetings with the U.K. authorities explaining what
information could or could not be shared.
As examples, a potential “reasonable efforts” standard for international
law enforcement cooperation could be modeled on Upjohn warnings175 or
Jencks Act disclosures.176 Upjohn warnings require lawyers representing
companies to make clear to individual employees that they do not represent
the individuals themselves but only their employer.177 The standard for clearly
communicating Upjohn warnings to a corporation’s employees seems
appropriate because much of the efforts by U.S. prosecutors to avoid taint
will be good faith, clear communication with foreign authorities about what
is/isn’t acceptable under U.S. law.178 The “good faith efforts” framework could
also be informed by the international applicability of Jencks Act disclosures,
wherein prosecutors are expected by some courts to make good faith efforts
to obtain copies of prosecution witness statements in the possession of

174 See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Kastigar at 2
n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
175 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
176 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).
177 See JONATHAN BEN-ASHER, AM. BAR ASS’N, ISSUES IN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
OF EXECUTIVES 14-17 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/
2017/03/err/papers/issues_in_internal_investigations.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/55D6RXDH] (outlining the obligations of Upjohn warnings and their traditional components as laid
out in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and by the American Bar Association).
178 As outlined in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3, the company’s
lawyer “shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall
not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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foreign governments.179 However, that analogy is constrained by the
complexities in Jencks Act case law.180
Any form of a “reasonable best efforts” test has interesting implications for
law enforcement. Because of the heavy Kastigar burden on the prosecution,
avoiding such a hearing would also save judicial resources without detracting
from the goal of preventing government overreach. The threat of a Kastigar
hearing would encourage good faith efforts by prosecutors, but accidental
missteps by foreign counterparts would not occasion a mistrial or concern U.S.
investigators to the point of diverting departmental resources to establish brand
new filter teams to support a case. This proposal would keep control, and
responsibility, entirely under the purview of U.S. law enforcement authorities,
stopping the inevitable dismissal of cases based on foreign counterpart actions
that would occur under other standards through no fault of U.S. authorities.181
An odd consequence of this proposal is that the privilege against
self-incrimination would no longer be an absolute protection against the use
of irreparably tainted testimony at trial. Instead, while the privilege would be
acknowledged to apply to foreign government–compelled testimony, some
otherwise inadmissible testimony would be allowed to enter trials simply
because it was collected by foreign agents and then leaked to U.S. prosecutors
or witnesses despite American best efforts to avoid leakage.
Importantly, defining “taint” is a fundamentally different exercise than
judging an allowable degree of taint. Under strict taint wall standards as seen
in the North case,182 the question becomes whether or not taint occurred.
179 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying a good-faith efforts
standard to a failed U.S. prosecutorial attempt to obtain all relevant materials from foreign law
enforcement); see also United States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
that prosecutors are at most required to use good-faith efforts to procure foreign law enforcement
materials and finding U.S. officials met that burden).
180 See United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 285 n.20 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to extend the
Paternina-Vergara ruling); United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding
that the U.S. government was not required under the Jencks Act to produce information seized by
the Chilean government but not addressing any sort of “best efforts” standard); cf. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (distinguishing
U.S. law enforcement obligations from those articulated in Paternina-Vergara on the grounds that
the U.S. government was engaged in a “joint venture” with foreign law enforcement officials).
181 Cf. supra note 91 (noting from practitioners that the Second Circuit’s Allen decision will increase
the prosecutorial burden to a degree that in some cases prosecutions will be abandoned). The Balsys Court
was particularly concerned with this issue in its holding on the converse of the Allen situation. See United
States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698 (1998) (“We therefore must suppose that on Balsys’s view some
evidence will in fact be lost to the domestic courts, and we are accordingly unable to dismiss the position
of the United States in this case, that domestic law enforcement would suffer serious consequences if fear
of foreign prosecution were recognized as sufficient to invoke the privilege.”).
182 United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (judging the taint wall
insufficient against a much higher Kastigar standard that required proof “that the witness was never
exposed to North’s immunized testimony, or that the allegedly tainted testimony contain[ed] no
evidence not ‘canned’ by the prosecution before such exposure occurred”).
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Under this proposal, irreparable taint stipulated to have occurred under any
standard could be admissible at trial. This result would be a novel legal
development and a step backward for strong constitutional protections. The
relatively low bar set by a reasonable best efforts standard for prosecutors that
allows for admittedly unconstitutional testimony to enter U.S. trials violates
our values and creates some potential for prosecutorial manipulation. Overall,
a standalone “reasonable best efforts” test would create significant
vulnerabilities in constitutional protections.
D. Setting a Clear Line for Cooperative Internationalism
Another option is to set a clear line based on the Balsys concept of
cooperative internationalism.183 Such a test would question U.S. law
enforcement control over testimony and create more generally an on–off
standard of applicability. From the current precedent, there would seem to be
a sliding scale for cooperative internationalism: at one extreme is Balsys,
finding no Fifth Amendment protections because the foreign authorities act
entirely separately from U.S. authorities,184 and at the other extreme is In re
Terrorist Bombings, where Fifth Amendment protections are implicated when
foreign governments allow U.S. officials to enter their territory and conduct
interrogations of suspects themselves.185 Somewhere between these two
extremes is the threshold for what could constitute cooperative
internationalism, which the Balsys Court only briefly addresses.186 As
discussed in Section II.B., current practices could, on a case-by-case basis, be
found to constitute cooperative internationalism. The Balsys Court seems to
identify a few factors: (1) substantially similar criminal codes aimed at
prosecuting offenses of an international character,187 (2) evidence that
prosecutors were intentionally granting immunity with the intention of
providing that evidence for prosecutions in the partner country, and (3) so
183
184
185

See supra Section II.B.
Balsys, 524 U.S. at 692.
See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 177, 181 (2d
Cir. 2008); cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2003).
186 See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 696 (stating that a cost–benefit analysis would be necessary to
determine whether cooperative internationalism should be found).
187 Note that efforts to standardize criminal codes were underway well before Balsys was
decided, as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Extradition Treaties have long relied on the
concept of dual criminality—that something must be a crime in both countries—in order to offer
international evidence gathering or extradition assistance. For a general discussion of Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties and international law enforcement cooperation channels, including a discussion
of dual criminality, see Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime:
International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
209 (2002) and specifically page 214 n.15 for a citation to the U.S. extradition treaty with Egypt
dating back to 1874.
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little differentiation between the two enforcement authorities that prosecution
could not be “fairly characterized as distinctly ‘foreign.’”188 These stringent
factors can be interpreted to implicate a quasi-agency doctrine, requiring that
the foreign government have acted as an agent of the U.S. government.
The problem with the Balsys test alone, as argued by some, is that it allows
for significant manipulation by prosecutors and removes any Fifth
Amendment burdens from them so long as foreign counterparts are kept
somewhat at arm’s length.189 Furthermore, this approach would raise many
technicalities: What if prosecutors are only acting under cooperative
internationalism on certain aspects of a case? What if prosecutors cooperate
in bad faith with foreign counterparts knowing the results will be useful to
circumvent the Fifth Amendment even if they are not working particularly
closely together? What if other governmental officials, like the State
Department or members of Congress, intervene to ensure the “right
questions” from an American perspective are asked by foreign authorities to
avoid U.S. prosecutorial involvement?190 By defining the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment in terms of this single dimension, the standard would leave
much room for abuse of discretion by prosecutors to chip away at the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
E. Recommending a Hybrid
Ultimately, I suggest that courts adopt a middle ground, combining the Balsys
test, which measures the extent of international cooperation,191 with a requirement
of good faith that is presumed where prosecutors make reasonable best efforts to
prevent taint. First, courts would analyze the closeness of coordination between
U.S. and foreign law enforcement under the cooperative internationalism
standard, likely approximating the joint venture standard outlined in the
188 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698 (“If it could be said that the United States and its allies had enacted
substantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international character, and if it
could be shown that the United States was granting immunity from domestic prosecution for the purpose
of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors of a crime common to both
countries, then an argument could be made that the Fifth Amendment should apply based on fear of
foreign prosecution simply because that prosecution was not fairly characterized as distinctly ‘foreign.’”).
189 See James C. Moon, Fifth Amendment Apogee: How the Supreme Court’s Ruling in United
States v. Balsys Checked American Ideas of Personal Liberty at Our Borders, 32 CONN. L. REV. 351,
377-79 (1999) (arguing that the Balsys decision was an invitation to government overreach and too
quickly relieves prosecutors of the Fifth Amendment burden).
190 This concern would likely not be as significant because Fifth Amendment privileges against
self-incrimination apply to other U.S. governmental bodies like executive branch employers and
Congress, as discussed in Section III.C, so it does not seem a stretch to assume that those entities
could also trigger charges of “cooperative internationalism.”
191 Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698 (postulating that the threshold for cooperative internationalism is
based on the relative level of coordination in which two governments engage).
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voluntariness analysis of subsection III.B.1. In circumstances where cooperative
internationalism is found, there would be a black-and-white application of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Foreign government–compelled testimony
would not be admissible in U.S. courts. For situations judged to demonstrate less
than cooperative internationalism, foreign government–compelled testimony
would be admissible in U.S. courts unless bad faith efforts by prosecutors called
into question the true nature of international cooperation in that case.
Accordingly, U.S. prosecutors would be expected to take reasonable efforts in
good faith to prevent taint of their witnesses, evidence, and other aspects related
to trial. As in the FCPA context,192 respecting the laws of countries where a
slightly different right to self-incrimination exists could be considered good
faith efforts on the part of a prosecutor.
Although unorthodox, this solution best recognizes the unique, third
party nature of foreign governments. It has the benefit of establishing some
Fifth Amendment protections while minimizing the number of cases lost due
to taint leakage. Such a policy would leave prosecutors wide discretion in
their dealings with foreign governments and would allow them to put faith in
their best judgments. It would also remedy the intellectual consistency issue
of a reasonable best efforts standard, focusing the analysis on the overall
foreignness of the testimony rather than the actions of U.S. prosecutors
related to tainted testimony. More practically, because of the increasing
globalization of economies and crime,193 prosecutors need to have clear
guidelines, which this would provide, and flexibility when dealing with an
issue that, in some cases, will simply be out of the control of U.S. law
enforcement. A standard like this proposed hybrid would accommodate the
nuances of cases likely to arise in this constitutional grey area and would
effectively balance constitutional protections and the rule of law.
F. Requiring Full Fifth Amendment Protections
A sixth path is to follow the Second Circuit and require that all Justice
Department investigations go beyond even the measures the Department
took in Allen. Although this would be resource intensive, it would also provide
the most effective safeguard of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by
eliminating the possibility of even an accidental leakage between a foreign
and domestic prosecution. However, given the spike since 2008 in
192 See supra Section IV.B.
193 See UNITED NATIONS
CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL

OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF
ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT ii (2010),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8UQ-SMLM] (discussing the unprecedented pace of economic globalization and
new transnational criminal developments it has spurred).

2018]

A New Hurdle to International Cooperation

827

international white collar crime investigations, and with international law
enforcement cooperation accompanying that spike, this path may be
unsustainable in the long run, or may significantly damage the rule of law
with regards to international crimes.194 Inevitably, errors by foreign
counterparts or unintentional mistakes by U.S. authorities will lead to case
dismissals where prosecutors could otherwise secure convictions. In addition,
this policy would be susceptible to manipulation by foreign powers, who
could sabotage U.S. trials by intentionally publicizing tainted information.
Though the Second Circuit dismissed such a concern in its ruling as no longer
truly “involuntary” testimony,195 one can easily think of situations where a
corrupt regime could obscure how voluntary testimony truly was, and a U.S.
court would not be well-equipped to draw the line between corrupt voluntary
testimony and legitimately compelled testimony. Also, it seems odd that the
U.S. government would only accept corruptly compelled testimony and
would reject as unconstitutional testimony collected legitimately under the
rule of law in another country. If anything, this outcome contravenes the
reliability justification for a voluntariness standard discussed in subsection
III.B.1, because testimony contrived by a foreign government for the purpose
of stymieing a U.S. investigation is not likely to be reliable. More
fundamentally, defendants in international crimes would functionally receive
stronger protections than defendants in purely domestic crimes, as
prosecutors face complex international evidentiary burdens that prevent
them from pursuing cases they would have no trouble prosecuting
domestically.196 Given that international crimes implicating U.S. jurisdiction
in this context are far more likely to be perpetrated by those with the
resources to travel and communicate internationally, this discrepancy
privileges rich defendants over poor defendants.197 When dealing with an
194 See generally Lara Kroop Delamarre, Preparing for DOJ’s International Investigations, LAW360
(Feb. 15, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/891511/preparing-for-doj-s-internationalinvestigations [https://perma.cc/4LCK-KDLG] (highlighting the DOJ’s increased focus on pursuing
international white collar crime); The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Plan and Guidance,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/838416/download [https://perma.cc/FVX5-FFVS] (demonstrating the DOJ’s commitment
of resources to FCPA cases, which often involve cooperative prosecutions with foreign governments).
195 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 88 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[S]hould the circumstances in a particular
case indicate that a foreign defendant had faced no real threat of sanctions by his foreign government for
not testifying, then that defendant’s testimony might well not be considered involuntary.”).
196 See supra note 91.
197 At the same time, note that the full scope of transnational crime is hard to quantify or define, though
it includes many crimes traditionally committed by those with resources. Cf. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, THE GLOBAL REGIME FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIME (2013) https://www.cfr.org/report/
global-regime-transnational-crime [https://perma.cc/FP8M-ZAEH] (discussing current trends in types and
scope of transnational crime, including increased trafficking of drugs and counterfeit medicines,
environmental crimes like illegal logging, and arms smuggling). However, this argument is predicated
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issue as complex as foreign government–compelled testimony, it is hard to
establish a straightforward answer.
CONCLUSION
As highlighted in the post-trial Kastigar hearing from United States v.
Allen198 (though seemingly denied in the Second Circuit opinion199), there is
no national consensus in current jurisprudence on whether compelled
testimony elicited by a foreign government violates the Fifth Amendment. Yet
there will come a time when other circuits facing cases like Allen will need to
address the admissibility of foreign government–compelled testimony. While
analogous Supreme Court precedent in Balsys seems to speak to the issue
through its reasoning and provides a model for determining admissibility
through its warnings on cooperative internationalism, the practical application
of any doctrine will be fact-specific until a sufficient number of these cases
reach the courts. Courts considering similar cases in the future can find
ammunition for applicability in the silent assumptions of Bram, where the
historical practice of applying the Self-Incrimination Clause in international
cases dates back to 1897. They might also adopt principles, particularly on
voluntariness and due process, from the Miranda warnings case law. Other
similarly-situated entities as compared to U.S. law enforcement, like
Congress, can also provide insight into how a non-U.S. law enforcement entity
should be treated with regards to U.S. constitutional obligations.
Pulling from this amalgamation of U.S. policies and traditions,
possibilities for how courts will rule under the current case law are numerous.
Among six different points along the potential spectrum of protections, this
Comment recommends a hybrid policy balancing constitutional protections
and reasonable efforts by prosecutors by emphasizing the closeness of
coordination between U.S. law enforcement and their foreign counterparts, as
well as efforts by prosecutors, where cooperation is not exceptionally close, to
prevent taint. Different courts may choose different approaches to enforcing
Fifth Amendment protections on foreign government–compelled testimony,
but it is important that the jurisprudence on this question evolve quickly and
clearly so as not to waste excessive government resources on unprosecutable
or unwinnable cases. International law enforcement cooperation is
skyrocketing, and with it will come new challenges for our government.
Although this may require courts to take a more active role in foreign affairs,
it reflects the new realities of globalization: justice is no longer a local concern.
on the assumption that law enforcement authorities will pursue predominantly the leaders of
international criminal organizations, rather than the lowest-level members who may lack means.
198 United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
199 Supra note 6.

